CIA Inspector General MKULTRA Report

1. The provisions of the MKULTRA authority also [several words illegible/redacted in this copy] ... The administration and control of [a further redacted subject] latter activity were found to be generally satisfactory and are discussed in greater detail in the main body of the report on TSD.

1. MKULTRA was authorized by the then Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Allen W. Dulles, in 1953. TSD was assigned responsibility thereby to employ a portion of its budget, eventually set at 20%, for research in behavioral materials under purely internal and compartmented controls (further details are provided in paragraphs 3-4 of the attached report). Normal procedures for project approval, funding, and accounting were waived. However, special arrangements for audit of expenditures have been evolved in subsequent years.

The scope of MKULTRA is comprehensive and ranges from the search for and procurement of botanical and chemical substances, through programs for their analysis in scientific laboratories, to progressive testing for effect on animals and human beings. The testing on individuals begins under laboratory conditions employing every safeguard and progresses gradually to more and more realistic operational simulations. The program requires and obtains the services of a number of highly specialized authorities in many fields of the natural sciences.

The concepts involved in manipulating human behavior are found by many people both within and outside the Agency to be distasteful and unethical. There is considerable evidence that opposition intelligence services are active and highly proficient in this field. The experience of TSD to date indicates that both the research and the employment of the materials are expensive and often unpredictable in results.

Nevertheless, there have been major accomplishments both in research and operational employment. The principal conclusions of the inspection are that the structure and operational controls over this activity need strengthening; improvements are needed in the administration of the research projects; and some of the testing of substances under simulated operational conditions was judged to involve excessive risk to the Agency.

Attached for the signature of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence is a memorandum transmitting the report to the Deputy Director/Plans requesting a summary of action taken or comments on the recommendations contained therein.

[Excerpt begins mid-paragraph 11; the opening of the paragraph, describing the arrangement below, is not included in this excerpt.]

1. ...with certain cleared and witting individuals in the Bureau of Narcotics in 1955 which provided for the release of MKULTRA materials for such testing as those individuals deemed desirable and feasible. The initial arrangement obtained the services of a senior representative of the Bureau and one of his assistants on the West Coast. A parallel arrangement was established on the East Coast in 1961. The Director of the Bureau has been briefed on the activity, but the Deputy Chief, TSD, who has guided MKULTRA from its inception, is of the opinion that the former would disclaim all knowledge and responsibility in the event of compromise. The MKULTRA program director has, in fact, provided close supervision of the testing program from the beginning and makes periodic visits to the sites. A sum of money has been provided annually to each of the two projects to cover cost of cultivation of "targets" and of maintenance of a safehouse in each area for the observation of effects of substances on selected test individuals.

1. The particular advantage of these arrangements with the Bureau of Narcotics officials has been that test subjects could be sought and cultivated within the setting of narcotics control. Some subjects have been informers or members of suspect criminal elements from whom the Bureau has obtained results of operational value through the tests. On the other hand, the effectiveness of the substances on individuals at all social levels, high and low, native American and foreign, is of great significance and testing has been performed on a variety of individuals within these categories.

1. A significant limitation on the effectiveness of such testing is the infeasibility of performing scientific observation of results. The Bureau agents are not qualified scientific observers. Their subjects are seldom accessible beyond the first hours of the test. The testing may be useful in perfecting delivery techniques, and in identifying surface characteristics of onset, reaction, attribution, and side-effect. In a number of instances, however, the test subject has become ill for hours or days, including hospitalization in at least one case, and the agent could only follow up by guarded inquiry after the test subject's return to normal life. Possible sickness and attendant economic loss are inherent contingent effects of the testing.

1. The MKULTRA program officer stated that the objectives of covert testing concern the field of toxicology rather than medicine; further, that the program is not intended to harm test individuals, and that medical consultation and assistance is obtained when appropriate through separate MKULTRA arrangements. The risk of compromise of the program through correct diagnosis of an illness by an unwitting medical specialist is regularly considered and is stated to be a governing factor in the decision to conduct the given test. The Bureau officials also maintain close working relations with local police authorities which could be utilized to protect the activity in critical situations.

1. There have been several discussions in the public press in recent months on the use of certain MKULTRA-type drugs to influence human behavior. Broadly speaking, these have argued that research knowledge of possible adverse effects of such substances on human beings is inadequate, that some applications have done serious harm, and that professional researchers in medicine and psychiatry are split on the ethics of performing such research. Increasing public attention to this subject is to be expected.

1. The final step in the research and development sequence is the delivery of MKULTRA materials into the MKDELTA control system governing their employment in clandestine operations. The subject is discussed further in the next section; however, it is appropriate here to note that the employment of MKDELTA materials remains an art rather than a scientific procedure. A significant number of variables in the target individual, including age, sex, weight, general health, social status, and personality structure, may account for widely varying and unpredictable reactions to a given drug in a given dosage.

1. The final stage of covert testing of materials on unwitting subjects is clearly the most sensitive aspect of MKULTRA. No effective cover story appears to be available. TSD officials state that responsibility for covert testing is transferred to the Bureau of Narcotics. Yet they also predict that the Chief of the Bureau would disclaim any knowledge of the activity. Present practice is to maintain no records of the planning and approval of test programs. The principal responsibility for the propriety of such testing rests with the MKULTRA program director and the Deputy Chief of TSD. The handling of test subjects in the last analysis rests with the Narcotics agent working alone. Suppression of knowledge of critical results from the top and CIA management is an inherent risk in these operations.

1. Final phase testing of MKULTRA substances or devices on unwitting subjects is recognized to be an activity of genuine importance in the development of some but not all MKULTRA products. Termination of such testing would have some, but an essentially indeterminate, effect on the development of operational capability in this field. Of more critical significance, however, is the risk of serious damage to the Agency in the event of compromise of the true nature of this activity. As now performed under Bureau of Narcotics auspices, non-Agency personnel are necessarily fully witting of the true nature and significance of their assignments, and of the sponsorship of CIA. Compromise of this information intentionally or unwittingly by these individuals at some time in the future is a hazard that cannot be ruled out. A test subject may on some occasion in the future correctly attribute the cause of his reaction and secure independent professional medical assistance in identifying the exact nature of the substance employed, and by whom. An extreme reaction to a test substance could lead to a Bureau request for cooperation from local authorities in suppressing information of the situation. This would in turn broaden the circle of individuals who possessed at least circumstantial evidence of the nature of the activity.

Weighing possible benefits of such testing against the risks of compromise and of resulting damage to CIA has led the Inspector General to recommend termination of this phase of the MKULTRA program. Existing checks and balances on the working level management of such testing do not afford the senior command of CIA adequate protection against the high risks involved.

1. It does not follow that termination of covert testing of MKULTRA materials on unwitting U.S. citizens will bring the program to a halt. Some testing on foreign nationals has been occurring under the present arrangements. Various U.S. deep cover agents overseas would appear to be more favorably situated than the U.S. narcotics agents to perform realistic testing. Finally, the operational use of the substances clearly serves the testing function in view of the lack of predictability of human reactions.

[The report continues with the safeguards recommended for the remaining, narrower research and testing program; that material is omitted here.]